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Abstract
I provide a critical commentary regarding the attitude of the logician and the
philosopher towards the physicist and physics. The commentary is intended to show-
case how a general change in attitude towards making scientific inquiries can be ben-
eficial for science as a whole. However, such a change can come at the cost of looking
beyond the categories of the disciplines of logic, philosophy and physics. It is through
self-inquiry that such a change is possible, along with the realization of the essence
of the middle that is otherwise excluded by choice. The logician, who generally holds
a reverential attitude towards the physicist, can then actively contribute to the bet-
terment of physics by improving the language through which the physicist expresses
his experience. The philosopher, who otherwise chooses to follow the advancement
of physics and gets stuck in the trap of sophistication of language, can then be of
guidance to the physicist on intellectual grounds by having the physicist’s experience
himself. In course of this commentary, I provide a glimpse of how a truthful conversion
of verbal statements to physico-mathematical expressions unravels the hitherto unre-
alized connection between Heisenberg uncertainty relation and Cauchy’s definition of
derivative that is used in physics. The commentary can be an essential reading if the
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When the physicist speaks of “logic”, he does not care about being logical in the sense of the
logician who delves for arithmetization of language, let alone the fact that the physicist uses
the same symbol, with different senses, in the same process of reasoning while performing
dimensional analysis[1]. Plethora of examples can be given, but a few should be enough to
draw the attention of the reader. Einstein speaks of “contradictions” in the introductory
part of ref.[3] as he makes an assumption “that the definition of synchronism is free from
contradictions”, on page no. 45 of ref.[4]. However, he does not provide any formal analysis
with the propositions, the assumptions and the postulates from which these “contradictions”
can be understood from the logician’s point of view. Although Newton axiomatizes physics
in refs.[11, 12], however still today the physicist never does a formal logical analysis in the
sense of what the logician does e.g. see refs.[6, 5, 7, 8]. Possibly due to such reasons Poincare
writes, regarding the arithmetic precision of the physicist’s reasoning, “that it is precisely in
the proofs of the most elementary theorems that the authors of classic treatises have displayed
the least precision and rigour.” (see page no. 6 of ref.[9]). Although he further points out
that “they have obeyed a necessity”, but he does not explain what the “necessity” is. As
it appears to me, the “necessity” is to operate i.e. to do something of a practical essence
which one can experience materially (through bodily perceptions). It is such an operational
mindset that founds the basis of all efforts by the physicist[36]. Indeed the term “definition”,
without which any theory of physics is crippled, is also taken in this particular sense of being
operational, rather than being logical in the sense of the logician[1]. Notably, motivated by
“Einstein’s treatment of simultaneity”1, Bridgman considers “definition” to be “operational”
by writing that “the true meaning of a term is to be found by observing what a man does
with it, not by what he says about it. ” (see page no. 7 of ref.[36]).
But, then why does the physicist talk about logic? What is the necessity of the axioms,
the postulates, the theorems, etc. if the reliance is on being operational? It is because
without “saying” or writing, theories can not be written and without written theories ex-
periments have no essence. So, language and its logical structure do have an indispensable
role in science. And here comes the question that how truthfully the physicist expresses the
experience. It appears to me that the physicist’s expressions of experience are susceptible
to very basic questions of reason[1].
Why does he write “zero length”, instead of writing “negligible length”, while seeing
a dot of the pencil on a paper [15]? Is it just because he wants to base his theory, on
the first axiom of geometry rather than on practical experience and be logical rather than
1Regarding being “operational”, Einstein has been motivated by Mach[2].
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being operational? If I consider the very basic traits of a table top experiment, why does
the physicist ignore the thickness of the cross-wire while writing theories to explain the
observation and measured data, in spite of being unable to dispense with that thickness in
the process of measurement?
If the physicist can not take into account such simple truths of experience, then how can
he write down a theory of everything[37] or even dream of a final theory[38] or provide a
complete guide to reality[39]?
I believe, it is the inability of judging one’s own truthfulness or, in other words, a lack of
self-inquiry that leads the physicist to believe in achieving completeness – a belief so strong
that it makes the rational mind incapable of realizing the impossibility of the expression of
the self and the essence of the middle way that provides the ground for categorization of
truths e.g. see section (2) of ref.[1] for a simple demonstration with drawing. Importantly,
the logician and the philosopher, who are supposed to carry out such inquiries regarding the
language of the physicist, chooses not to question, and sometimes shows a reverential attitude
towards, the physicist. Indeed it is the physicist who, at times, have questioned the basic
principles with which the logician operates [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35] and have doubted, or rather
dismissed altogether, the significance of the philosopher in the context of physics[37, 38].
In what follows, I provide some comments meant for the logician and the philosopher in
order to explain how the logician lacks the attitude of self-inquiry and how both choose not
to question the physicist’s dogma, which otherwise could have led physics through a different
path of evolution. Many a times, at the cost of sophistication of language, the truthfulness of
the expressions of experience, is sacrificed by the logician and the philosopher. A change in
attitude by the logician and the philosopher to look beyond the categories may be beneficial
to the physicist and fruitful for science as a whole.
Although the essence of the present work is best realized in relation to ref.[1], but reading
this in isolation can also be a fruitful experience. I hope the following commentary proves
to be worthy of reading to the reader who is willing to see through beyond the categories of
logic, philosophy and physics by being ‘nobody’[1].
2 Comments for the logician
Tarski writes on page no. 152 of ref.[27]):
“The question how a certain concept is to be defined is correctly formulated only if a list is given
of the terms by means of which the required definition is to be constructed. If the definition is to
fulfill its proper task, the sense of the terms in this list must admit of no doubt.”
Tarski’s assertion that the definition of a concept “must admit of no doubt” manifests
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the general belief of the logician that there must be completeness of reason. Such an attitude
disregards that the terms of the list themselves can retain doubt i.e. the premise itself may
be questionable. This can be understood by one’s attitude of self-inquiry that provides the
seed of doubt, by questioning the self – do I know the meaning of each and every term? If not
then how can the definition fulfill its proper task? It is true that such self-inquiry has to stop
somewhere so as to have a working definition. However, then the doubt is always retained.
To have this realization there is no necessity to learn the specific jargon of mathematical
logic. Rather it depends on self-awareness. It is on such grounds that the logico-linguistic
inquiry regarding the foundations of physics has been done in ref.[1]. The logician’s lack
of self-inquiry and his exclusion of the middle from consideration leads him to the belief
of completeness. I provide the following commentary on Frege’s views on completeness of
definition, which the reader may compare with the discussion in section (2) of ref.[1] for a
better understanding.
2.1 Frege on Definition: a metaphor and self-inquiry
In highlighting the logician’s attitude to achieve completeness of logic it is worth mentioning
Frege’s work in ref.[28]. Frege’s attitude towards achieving completeness in the definition of
a concept reflects from his naming of the introductory section as “Principle of Completeness”
on page no. 159 of ref.[28]. Further, he writes:
“A definition of a concept (of a possible predicate) must be complete; it must unambiguously
determine, as regards any object, whether or not it falls under the concept (whether or not the
predicate is truly assertible of it). Thus there must not be any object as regards which the definition
leaves in doubt whether it falls under the concept;...”
Frege asserts that the definition of a concept must be “complete” and there should be
no place for “doubt”, although he is not sure whether his judgment about the definition of
a concept is decisive or not, as he continues to write:
“...though for us men, with our defective knowledge, the question may not always be decidable.”
This indecisiveness of Frege, if analyzed with honesty through self-inquiry, gets mani-
fested in the expressions of his thoughts through a geometric metaphor as follows:
“We may express this metaphorically as follows: the concept must have a sharp boundary. If
we represent concepts in extension by areas on a plane, this is admittedly a picture that may be
used only with caution, but here it can do us good service.”
Here, I may note that Frege writes about “expressing” a metaphor. Now, any expression
of a human being comes out through some mode of expression. Since Frege wants to express
5
by drawing lines to form areas on a plane, he needs a drawing object, say, a pencil whose
tip has a spread or thickness that gets manifested on paper as the thickness of a point and
therefore, of any line drawn with that pencil. I do not know what “caution” Frege tries
to point out. However, if it is the irremovable thickness of the pencil-tip that stands for
the “caution”, then this metaphor only does limited service as far as the completeness of a
concept is concerned. To explain this I need to quote Frege further as follows:
“To a concept without sharp boundary there would correspond an area that had not a sharp
boundary-line all round, but in places just vaguely faded away into the background.”
Here, I emphasize that the “vaguely faded away” portions can only be removed up to
the thickness of the pencil-tip. Therefore, the notion of completeness of the definition of a
concept must depend on the context as, metaphorically, the concept of the area is precise
only up to the thickness of the pencil-tip. If the pencil-tip does not have a thickness then the
drawn line also has no thickness. Such line can not be seen so that an expression through
a drawing can be given. It is such a directly observable truth that Frege ignores while
advocating his “Principle of Completeness”. If I write – “up to now no one has ever seen
a line with no thickness” – then this statement is a direct derivative of what Frege himself
writes on page no. 11 of ref.[10]:
“..... for up to now no one.... has ever seen or touched 0 pebbles.”
I can safely conclude that completeness comes with the ignorance of incompleteness. In
other words, doubt can not be removed completely as the truth depends on the context and
hence, is only relational and not absolute.
Now, Frege writes further:
“This would not really be an area at all; and likewise a concept that is not sharply defined is
wrongly termed a concept. Such quasi-conceptual constructions cannot be recognized as concepts by
logic; it is impossible to lay down precise laws for them. The law of excluded middle is really just
another form of the requirement that the concept should have a sharp boundary.”
Corresponding to this passage I may write as follows. The area with a sharp boundary
that Frege wants to express is only a wish of the human mind to achieve the vanishing limit
of the thickness of the boundary. I find it trivial to note that this limit can not be achieved
in practice i.e. the wish can not be fulfilled. This is because, if the boundary vanishes then
it can not be seen and the concept of area can not be expressed. Therefore, the truth of
the area is valid only in a limiting sense that I can consider complete by assumption. This
assumption is the ignorance of the context which is here the thickness of the boundary.
Then, the law of excluded middle is the limiting case of the whole truth that includes the
context where the limit is achieved by the ignorance of the context i.e. any judgment like
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“true” or “false” are only limited by the ignorance of the context.
The logician’s attitude to achieve completeness of logic gets reflected more profoundly
from the next statement of Frege that I quote as follows. On page no. 161 of ref.[28], Frege
writes:
“It may be difficult to satisfy the demands of logic always in giving definitions; but it must be
possible.”
The statement is just a reflection of the attitude of a logician to achieve completeness of
logic. This is because the phrase – “must be possible” – is a forceful assumption that results
from a hard coded belief. Any human mind blinded by any belief only chases the same, even
if it has to ignore in the process any immediately perceivable belief-defying truth. Frege’s
case is an example where the logician chases completion of logic by believing in the same
and ignores the impossibility of attaining such feat that is directly realizable through his
own metaphor.
Now, the question arises whether it is at all possible to make formal analysis if a concept
can never be defined sharply as Frege asserts on page no. 166 of ref.[28]:
“....without complete and final definitions, we have no firm ground under-foot, we are not sure
about the validity of our theorems, and we cannot confidently apply the laws of logic, which certainly
presuppose that concepts, and relations too, have sharp boundaries.”
I believe it is a question of attitude. For me it is easy to admit that logical analysis
can certainly be done but only with concepts whose definitions are considered as complete
by assumption and not through achievement by means of any mode of expression. I find
it too easy to realize through an immediate self-inquiry, that is, I can never answer the
question – “Who/what am I?” – through any mode of expression that I can access. In
fact, I get confused whether to write “who” or “what” because it is the “I” that makes the
difference. In the language of the logician, I can never completely define the concept of “I”
through any mode of expression and I find any truth that I define and I claim to define is
readily incomplete due to my inability of expressing the concept that I symbolize as “I”.
Such an attitude of self-inquiry, if adopted by the logician, he will find it easy to realize that
completeness of any expression is achievable only by assumption.
2.2 The logician’s silence: a choice
While discussing about “definition” it is worth mentioning the involved writings of Quine
in refs.[40, 41, 42, 43]. However, I have no intention of presenting a detailed review of
different views of various logicians on “definition” in this article because that is unnecessary
in the present context. Rather the aim is to discuss certain basic logico-linguistic issues
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regarding physics which the logician does not care about. As I have pointed out in ref.[1],
the logician never dares to ask the question that how can the physicist claim to be logical
while using the same symbol to convey different meanings, viz. number and not number.
In fact, the literature reveals an opposite flow i.e. the physicist, based on the empirical
essence of physics, has questioned the foundations of logic [30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. Therefore, the
logician may consider the present work as the foothold to question the physicist, regarding
the issues concerning the logico-linguistic foundations of physics (or the expressions of the
physicist), which the concerned authors of ref.[30, 31, 32, 33, 34] take for granted in the
process. Although I shall provide shortly a glimpse of how a simple logico-linguistic inquiry,
by the logician, into the foundations of calculus could have unfounded the cornerstone on
which the authors of ref.[30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35] have built upon, let me first spend a few
more words on the attitude of the logician towards physics.
2.2.1 Quine on physics
To reflect the logician’s attitude towards physics and the physicist, I analyze some of Quine’s
relevant statements from ref.[41] as examples.
Quine writes on page 18-19:
“But what of physics? An antinomy arose between the undular and the corpuscular accounts
of light; and if this was not as out-and-out a contradiction as Russell’s paradox, I suspect that the
reason is that physics is not as out-and-out as mathematics.”
Quine’s suspicion is correct but he does not point out what distinguishes physics from
mathematics. The answer is – physical dimension. And, there is no “out and out” answer
to the question whether physical dimension is number or not number. If Quine would have
realized this, he would have understood the essence of the middle way. Rather, without such
realization, he takes the physicist and his physics for granted and only draws an analogy like
the following:
“Again, the second great modern crisis in the foundations of mathematics – precipitated in
1931 by Godel’s proof [2] that there are bound to be undecidable statements in arithmetic – has its
companion piece in physics in Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle.”.
Unfortunately such restricted views on mere analogies do not lead to any useful contri-
bution from the logician that can be of help to the physicist. Ironically, it is the Heisenberg
uncertainty (“indeterminacy”) principle[29] that lies at the foundation of ref.[30] that chal-
lenges the foundations of logic from which the logician earns his living. Strangely, the logician
remains silent even though the physicist does not follow logic (in the sense of the logician)
while making use of physical dimension to question the foundations of logic. Why? I believe
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that the failure to understand the essence of the middle way leads the logician to believe in
a possibly achievable completeness of logic and since any truth is only relational, the truth
of logic becomes the ultimate reality for the logician. Since the logician does not realize the
emptiness of logic, he is unable to question the physicist. Such shortcoming in the logician’s
strength of reasoning reflects even more properly from Quine’s words as he writes on page
no. 42:
“The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography
and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a
man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. ”
Here, Quine distinguishes between physics and pure mathematics. Then I wonder why
the adjective “pure” is necessary. Does that mean there is some impure mathematics as
well? If there is, then how is that different from pure mathematics? Is it that he wants
to refer to physics as impure mathematics? If he does, then what is that impurity? Is it
physical dimension?
It is interesting to note that Quine uses the words “physical lexicon” on page no. 99 of
ref.[42]:
“But the mathematical and logical component, purified of all physical lexicon, is not called
physics.”
where he discusses his views on the categorical divisions between sciences viz. logic,
mathematics and physics. Then I wonder why he does not inquire how physical lexicon can
be treated as number by the physicist during dimensional analysis while it is a priori not
number simply because it distinguishes physics from mathematics. Only Quine knows. But,
can the logician answer?
At the end of the day it becomes a matter of personal choice, albeit limited by the ability
of the logician, what he wants to question i.e. the logician has the right to choose whether
he wants to remain reverent towards the physicist or he wants to make an inquiry regarding
the illogical structure of the physicist’s expressions.
2.3 The logician’s missed opportunity: an example
The fact that the logician simply chooses what to question becomes very clear to me when
I find that he, in spite of being the master of nitpicking with words (which is necessary
for formalizing language), does not write a single word on why Cauchy’s verbal definition
of derivative is not converted properly into mathematical expressions. I explain this by
quoting Cauchy from page no. 11 of ref.[14] to note how he defined, what is known today
as, “derivative of a function” –
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“· · · function y = f(x) · · · variable x · · · an infinitely small increment attributed to the variable








will be infinitely small quantities. · · · these two terms indefinitely and simultaneously will approach
the limit of zero, the ratio itself may be able to converge toward another limit,...”
The mathematical expressions corresponding to Cauchy’s “infinitely small quantities”,
in modern notation, look like “∆x → 0,∆y → 0” in the above quoted example. The point
to be noted here is that, according to Cauchy’s prescription, one needs both “∆y → 0” and












3 y = f(x). (2)
Here, the symbol “3” stands for “such that” and “:=” stands for “defined as” and I have
skipped the unnecessary step of setting ∆x = i. Even if I keep aside the question regarding
the use of the word “quantity”, I think it can be directly observed how the conversion of
the verbal statements into the corresponding mathematical expression leads to a different
scenario than what is taught generally in textbooks – the concept of limit is applied to the
denominator only e.g. see ref.[44, 45, 46, 47]. No sophisticated formalized language, like
what the logicians write, is needed to understand and demonstrate this. Yet, needless to
say, the implication is far reaching. Before providing a glimpse of such an implication, I
discuss how the logician only shows a reverential attitude towards the physicist rather than
making any logico-linguistic inquiry regarding the truthfulness of his expressions.
2.3.1 A logico-linguistic inquiry into the language of the logician
In The Ways of Paradox, which is the first essay in ref.[43], Quine makes a logico-linguistic
analysis of several paradoxes which necessitates very precise nitpicking of words. However,
in the relevant passages regarding calculus in The Foundations of Mathematics in ref.[43],
such preciseness of the inquiry goes missing. I explain this by quoting the relevant passages
and by offering suitable remarks as follows.
Quine writes:
“It was the idea of a fractional quantity infinitely close to zero, yet different from zero. It
seemed to be needed in the study of rates, which was the business of the differential calculus.”
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I note that Quine, who distinguishes between mathematics and physics due to the use
of “physical lexicon” (in his own words) in the later, does not notice that quantity and
number differ due to the involvement of the “physical lexicon”. It is the comparison of two
quantities that involves some number[1]. Then, I wonder how Quine compares quantity and
number. For example, if I question: “Which one of the following statements is meaningful?
– (a) The mass of the object is 1 gram. (b) The mass of the object is 1.”, I believe that any
reasonable thinker, free from the influence of any dogma or authority, will agree with me
that only option (a) is meaningful. And then the associated number depends on the unit
(i.e. the chosen standard quantity) with which the concerned quantity is being compared.
It is due to this reason “quantity infinitely close to zero” is also meaningless. Rather, what
seems meaningful to me is a statement like “quantity infinitely small compared to the unit”.
It is quite surprising to me why the logician, who is a fine nitpicker of words, fails to see
such a basic issue. The same ignorance of this logico-linguistic issue continues to reflect
through subsequent writings of Quine while he uses verbal expressions like “distance.....is
zero”, “infinitesimal distances”, “infinitesimal time”, etc. I wonder why the logician fails to
see such a vivid fact that distance is not number. So, how can it be “zero”? If distance or
time is “infinitesimal”, then why does the logician NOT raise the question “with respect to
what unit of length or time?”
Quine continues to write:
“Still the resulting calculus proved indispensable in reasoning mathematically about rates.”
As far as I understand, reasoning is primarily done verbally. To transmit the arguments
truthfully to the mathematical jargon it is necessary to be careful about the conversion
principles (which the logician is a master of). Then, how do the “physical lexicons” go
missing from the language of the logician? The question arises from Quine’s own distinction
between mathematics and physics on the basis of “physical lexicons”. I believe, it is a simple
fact to observe that mathematics, being devoid of “physical lexicons” can not be used to
convert the words like “distance”, “time”, etc. Then, is it that some physico-mathematical
reasoning is required to incorporate “physical lexicons”? And, if that is so, is not it that
all the expressions concerning the word “infinitesimal” must involve statements that express
comparison between two quantities? A logico-linguistic inquiry regarding the elements of
the physicist’s expressions becomes inevitable and necessary [1].
However, the logician, instead of making such a logico-linguistic inquiry, shows a rever-
ential attitude towards the physicist (or the mathematician who applies mathematics to do
physics without being concerned about “physical lexicons”). Such reverence is manifest as
Quine writes further:
“Cauchy and his followers in the nineteenth century solved the problem....... Each such distance-
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to-time ratio will multiply out to about a mile a minute, if the time interval is short.”
Here, some simple questions can be raised regarding the term “ratio”. In arithmetic, I
have come across ratio of two numbers and also in physics, I have learned the lesson that only
quantities with the same physical dimension (“lexicon”) can be compared. Then, what is the
meaning of “distance-to-time ratio”? Is not it that one needs to specify some arithmetical
rules for the use of “physical lexicons” to give meaning to such a phrase? But, how can
one specify arithmetic rules for “physical lexicons” because, as Quine writes, mathematics
is devoid of “physical lexicons”. Why does the logician ignore such vivid logico-linguistic
questions?
2.3.2 A glimpse of the impact of direct reasoning through logico-linguistic in-
quiry: towards Heisenberg uncertainty principle from Cauchy’s definition
of derivative
The physicist has challenged, at times, the foundations of logic based on what is known today
as “quantum mechanics” and the most distinct feature of this theory that plays a pivotal
role in the physicist’s arguments is the Heisenberg uncertainty principle[29]. While today
such logic is known as “quantum logic”[35], it started with Birkhoff and von Neumann who
called it “The logic of quantum mechanics”[30], Finkelstein coined the term “Physical logic”
[31] and Putnam called it “Empirical logic” [32]. There are others like Reichenbach[33] and
Dummett [34] who also proceeded along such lines of thought. Now, I provide a glimpse of
how the logician can make a direct logico-linguistic inquiry into the foundations of physics to
show the physicist that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, based on which the physicist
builds his arguments regarding quantum/physical/empirical logic, follows directly from the
criteria for the definition of derivative.
To apply Cauchy’s definition of derivative to define instantaneous velocity, let me denote
the units of length and time as λ0 and T0 respectively. Then, I write the change in position
of an object as ∆x = ∆nxλ0 and the time interval as ∆t = ∆ntT0, where ∆nx,∆nt are
real positive numbers. So, I can write an inter-conversion among verbal expressions and
physico-mathematical expressions as follows:
“∆x is infinitesimally small compared to the length unit λ0” ⇔ ∆x λ0 ⇔ ∆nx → 0, (3)
“∆t is infinitesimally small compared to the time unit T0” ⇔ ∆t T0 ⇔ ∆nt → 0, (4)
where the expressions ∆nx → 0,∆nt → 0 corresponds to the limits. I prefer to write
“∆nx ≪ 1,∆nt ≪ 1” instead of “∆nx → 0,∆nt → 0” considering what I have discussed in
ref.[1] regarding “zero quantity”. However, I continue to use the notation so that the reader
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can connect with the usual convention.
Now, under the validity of such conditions, instantaneous velocity can be written in terms

























Now, to write down Newton’s second law, the derivative of momentum needs to be defined
according to Cauchy’s prescription. So, let me consider momentum (p) to be a quantity in its
own right. I denote a change in p as ∆p = ∆npp0 where p0 is the chosen unit of momentum.
Then the instantaneous rate of change of momentum can only be defined when the following
conditions are fulfilled:
“∆x is infinitesimally small compared to the length unit λ0” ⇔ ∆p p0 ⇔ ∆np → 0, (6)
“∆x is infinitesimally small compared to the length unit λ0” ⇔ ∆t T0 ⇔ ∆nt → 0. (7)
Then, the definition of instantaneous rate of change of momentum, according to Cauchy’s

























Since the conditions (3) and (6) are necessary for writing down classical mechanics, then
a I can certainly write down the following derived condition:
∆x.∆p L0 3 L0 := p0λ0. (9)
Therefore, if the above condition is violated then the basic definitions of the quantities
(discussed above) which are required to do classical mechanics, do not hold anymore. This
violation condition can be written as follows:
∆x.∆p & L0. (10)
Certainly L0 is restricted by our ability to chose the units of measurement and hence a more
precise reasoning is required to argue how L0 is equivalent to Planck’s constant that appear
in Heisenberg uncertainty principle[29], which I intend to present elsewhere. Nevertheless, I
believe, I have been able to present a glimpse of how direct reasoning can also be effective
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without the necessity of formalization. The logician, if makes such logico-linguistic inquiry
into the foundations of physics, then it will improve science as a whole.
Unfortunately, this is not the case in general. For example, Quine only mentions Heisen-
berg uncertainty (“indeterminacy”) principle with reverence and without further investiga-
tion in terms of logic and language. I consider this as a missed opportunity of the logician
to impact science, as a whole, with simple and direct reasoning. Although I do not deny
that the logician’s formalized language is required, however, I also can not get unnecessarily
detached from direct and simple logico-linguistic inquiry that can lead to efficient reasoning
for the betterment of science.
3 Comments for the philosopher
As far as philosophy of physics is concerned I find it convenient to categorize the philosopher
into two classes – one that actively contributes to physics without being worried much about
the structure of the language e.g. the authors of ref.[21, 23, 22] and the other that does not
contribute to physics but concentrates on the structure of language used by the physicist,
etc. e.g. the authors of ref.[16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. To make the difference between the two
classes clearer, I quote Maxwell from page no. 41 of ref.[13]:
“The torsion-balance was devised by Michell for the determination of the force of gravitation
between small bodies, and was used by Cavendish for this purpose. Coulomb, working independently
of these philosophers, reinvented it, and successfully applied it to discover the laws of electric and
magnetic forces; and the torsion-balance has ever since been used in all researches where small
forces have to be measured. ”
The philosopher of the present day (e.g. the authors of ref.[17, 18, 16, 19]), whom I call
“the philosopher” henceforth, is not like those who Maxwell called “philosophers”. Maxwell’s
philosophers (also include the authors of ref.[23, 22, 21]) actively contributed to the progress
of physics. Today, philosophy of physics2, hence the philosopher of physics, does not affect
physics directly, if not at all. As it appears to me, a possible reason is the detachment of
the philosopher from practical essence of doing physics and attachment with abstraction in
accord with the theoretical physicist of modern days. Consequently the philosopher, instead
of making an inquiry regarding the language of the physicist, adopts the language of the
physicist by taking it for granted and then plays with the structure of such language. As a
result, if the physicist is in trouble, so is the philosopher – no progress. The philosopher does
not show a path, not even theoretically, which the physicist can not see to find a solution
2I avoid using “philosophy of science” and rather choose to use “philosophy of physics” to keep my
viewpoint attached to the present context i.e. an inquiry regarding the foundations of physics.
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to some problem. This gives the chance to the physicist to blame the philosopher of physics
regarding his contribution to physics e.g. on page 135 of ref.[37], Hawking writes:
“......the people whose business it is to ask why – the philosophers – have not been able to keep
up with the advance of scientific theories.”
I must refrain from making such judgments about the philosopher, unlike the physicist, as
I find the above quote quite disrespectful. Rather I prefer to indulge in a discussion regarding
how the philosopher can take it to the physicist by asking some painful “why”-s and shake the
cherished foundations on which the physicist builds his dogma. Since I am concerned about
how truthfully the physicist converts his experiences into the corresponding expressions while
being operational, I put forward a question regarding a very basic statement adopted by the
physicist while writing down theories, which the philosopher can immediately appreciate
without having to “keep up” with the technicalities which the physicist dwell on in modern
days e.g. see ref.[48].
3.1 Why is there a time lapse to realize “t = 0”?
In physics, one finds no problem in writing the statement “t = 0”. Certainly it is meaningless
writing because of dimensional mismatch, as it goes for any other quantity like length, mass,
charge, etc[1]. Neither the physicist himself, nor the philosopher (nor the logician, especially
the logical empiricist[24, 25, 26]) finds any trouble in accepting such a statement (if the
philosopher realizes the problem at all). Even if I rectify the statement by saying that
“t = 0” means “zero unit of time”, there is a clear defiance of experience that is reflected
through such a statement. To experience that “zero unit of time” can not be experienced
in practice, I do not need to “keep up with the advance of scientific theories”. It is a
matter of self-inquiry through which I can ask myself, “ Am I being truthful in expressing
my perception when I write “zero unit of time”?” The answer that I get is “no” because
whatever clock I use to make any measurement of time, the initiation of the running of the
clock takes some time that can not be captured within the time measuring process of the
clock. That is, the underlying mechanism that lets the clock be a “clock” takes some time
to initiate the process through which the clock maintains its timing.
Ironically, it is the word “experience” that Einstein uses repeatedly in formulating the
foundations of his relativity theories in the introductory sections of ref.[3], although he does
not explain how to justify the experience of “t = 0”. As a matter of fact, “t = 0” is an
accepted statement used to explain “initial condition or the beginning” of some phenomenon
in theoretical physics. But, any honest experimental physicist will agree that “zero unit of
time” can not be experienced – there is always an experience of time lapse, however negligible
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it may be compared to the chosen time unit, in the context of the observation, when an
observation of some phenomenon is initiated. So, as it stands, the statement “t = 0” is only
helpful for doing calculations of theoretical physics, but it defies immediate experience. Such
a statement can be tolerated, albeit with a bit of skepticism, as long as it is used to write
theories that explain observed phenomena. However, the problem begins when the physicist
builds his dogma on the basis of such a statement irrespective of whether his statement has
any empirical basis at all. Such is the case when the physicist indulges in explaining the
“origin of universe” and discusses about “a complete theory” that can explain “everything”,
without realizing that he has not even been able to express the most basic of his perceptions
regarding “zero unit of time”[37]. Can the philosopher hold enough courage to ask the
physicist why such attitude itself is even permissible while doing physics in the pursuit of
truth? If the physicist’s investigations are based on the theories of relativity, which can not
take account of such an elementary bit of experience, how can the physicist (who is a part
of the universe) claim to be truthful at all while seeking to find the truth regarding “the
universe”?
3.2 The philosopher’s choice: primacy of sophistication or truth-
fulness
For me, philosophy has no barrier – rather it is a way to unshackle the mind from any
limitations of thought and bodily action. Therefore, I consider it as a loss of freedom when I
limit my thought because of some other person’s dogma. However, there is also the freedom
of choice. The philosopher can always choose not to question the dogma of the physicist and
just ignore crucial “why”-s like the one I discussed in the previous subsection. In that case,
such philosophy seems to be useless in the pursuit of truth and Hawking’s complain against
the philosopher stands firm, irrespective of the number of pages the philosopher fills or what
specific jargon and sophisticated notations he uses to express his thought. Feynman may
promptly say that “Scientists are explorers, philosophers are tourists.” (see page no. 260 of
ref.[49]).
Rather, Maxwell’s “philosophers” seem to be more useful from this perspective as he is
directly attached to experience of “t = 0” through experiment. So, with Maxwell’s “philoso-
phers”, a nitpicking of words of their experience (like what has been done regarding the
definition of electric field in ref.[1]) is more likely to have immediate effect on physics, and
hence will be of guidance to the physicist. If the philosopher follows the footsteps of Maxwell’s
“philosophers”, then he can guide the physicist rather than having to “keep up” with “the
advance”. Feynman may then call them “explorers”. To do this, the philosopher needs to
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explore the truthfulness of the relation between experience and expression, rather than fo-
cusing on the sophistication of the language which the physicist already has used to express
his experience. Indeed, it is in such spirit that gets manifested in ref.[1].
Digressing a bit, albeit necessarily due to the context, I may provide the following remarks
regarding ref.[1]. It is due to above reasons, if the reader categorizes ref.[1] as a work on
philosophy of physics, then certainly it inherits a distinctive feature when compared to
other works on philosophy of physics and that is – questioning, rather than adopting, the
language of the physicist with an aim to directly address certain the truthfulness of the
relation between experience and expression of the physicist. It is directed towards sharpening
the language of operations rather than the language of axioms i.e. the truthfulness of the
expression of experience gets the priority over the sophistication of language. And, it is due
to this single most reason, that ref.[1] is best presented in a form that is devoid of unnecessary
abstract notations and specific jargon which do not serve any purpose in resolving the issues
concerning the foundations of physics i.e. the elements of the physicist’s expressions of
experience. The skeptic philosopher can still choose sophistication as the primary motive,
but I choose the primacy of truthfulness based on self-inquiry. If the philosopher is still not
convinced, I may invite him for a scholarly debate on the following crucial “why”: Why is
there a visible dot to represent “r = 0” or “zero length”?[15]
4 Outlook
The physicist needs the logician and the philosopher. But, questions remain. Can the
logician bring out his sharpness of reasoning to question the physicist? Can the philosopher
delve into the infinitude of immediately realizable truths to provide more truthful means to
express the experience to guide the physicist on the intellectual ground? However, then the
categories of these disciplines become questionable. Can the logician, the philosopher and
the physicist look beyond their own categories, and respective sophistication, to find the
emptiness of each category? Certainly, I believe, these questions are worth considering. If
the singularity problem in physics can be resolved by a truthful conversion of the experience
of seeing a dot on the paper[15], if the essence of middle, which is excluded by choice by
the logician, can be understood by drawing a closed line with a pencil on the paper[1], if
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle can be realized in few steps from Cauchy’s definition
of derivative, then why is it so hard for the logician, the philosopher and the physicist to
break free of the shackles of categories and become ‘nobody’ for the betterment of science
as a whole?
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